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J O H N S T U A RT M I L L O N TA X O N O M Y
A N D N AT U R A L K I N D S
P. D. Magnus
The accepted narrative treats John Stuart Mill’s Kinds as the historical prototype for
our natural kinds, but Mill actually employs two separate notions: Kinds and natural
groups. Considering these, along with the accounts of Mill’s nineteenth-century interlocutors, forces us to recognize two distinct questions. First, what marks a natural kind
as worthy of inclusion in taxonomy? Second, what exists in the world that makes a
category meet that criterion? Mill’s two notions oﬀer separate answers to the two questions: natural groups for taxonomy and Kinds for ontology. This distinction is ignored
in many contemporary debates about natural kinds and is obscured by the standard
narrative that treats our natural kinds just as a development of Mill’s Kinds.

This article concerns debates about classiﬁcation in the nineteenth century between William Whewell (sec. 2), John Stuart Mill (sec. 3), and some lesser
known critics (sec. 4). I aim to show that Mill provides separate answers to
two important questions in the neighborhood of what we would now call
natural kinds: the taxonomy question, about what distinguishes categories
that are natural kinds from categories that are not, and the ontology question,
about what there is in the world that sustains that diﬀerence. Mill distinguishes natural groups as an answer to the taxonomy question and Kinds as
an answer to the ontology question for some—but importantly not all—
natural groups. This overturns the usual story, according to which Mill’s Kinds
map neatly onto our natural kinds, and it also reveals a distinction we would
do well to remember.
Contact P. D. Magnus at Department of Philosophy, University at Albany, State University of New
York, Albany, NY 12222 (pmagnus@fecundity.com).
This article grew out of earlier work on Mill’s account of Kinds, which was presented at Middlebury
College. Thanks to the audience there, as well as to anonymous referees, for helpful comments.
HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, vol. 5 (Fall 2015).
2152-5188/2015/0502-0003$10.00. © 2015 by the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science.
All rights reserved. Electronically published June 26, 2015
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1. The Standard Story
The standard narrative, promulgated by Ian Hacking (1991), is that the philosophical conception of natural kinds descends from John Stuart Mill’s notion
of Kinds (with a capital ‘K’). According to Hacking, this was a central piece of
a promising research program in the mid-nineteenth century that has since
degenerated. He argues that the concept is no longer fruitful, and so natural
kinds should be abandoned. In Hacking’s metaphor, Mill’s contribution was
the “rosy dawn” for natural kinds, current debates are a “scholastic twilight,”
and the day for thinking in terms of natural kinds has come to an end (Hacking
2007).
Hacking’s narrative is widely accepted. For example, John Dupré gestures
to the history of natural kinds by writing, “Ian Hacking reminded us that the
contemporary tradition of natural kinds arose . . . in the nineteenth century”
(2011, vii). The story has become suﬃciently commonplace that writers even
attribute the phrase ‘natural kind’ to Mill; for example, Alexander Bird and
Emma Tobin write, “J. S. Mill . . . was one of the ﬁrst to use the phrase ‘natural
kind’” (2009). Mill never used the phrase, however, even though his critics use
the phrase consistently later in the nineteenth century.1
So the narrative involves two claims of continuity: ﬁrst, that recent debates
are continuations of ones that began with Mill and, second, that the term of
Mill’s system that maps onto our ‘natural kind’ is his ‘Kind’. Both these claims
are mistaken, but my focus here is on the second.2 Mill’s terms do not map
one-to-one onto ours. In addition to Kinds, Mill has an account of natural
groups. Mill’s natural groups and Kinds answer two diﬀerent questions about
what we call natural kinds.3
The ﬁrst question is about what, as a matter of taxonomy, distinguishes
natural kinds from arbitrary categories: What criteria must a category satisfy to
count as a natural kind? This is not particularly an epistemic matter, because
we might not and perhaps could never be in a position to apply the criteria.
However, it is metaphysically somewhat thin. An answer to it speciﬁes what a

1. It is unclear exactly when Mill’s Kinds came to be called ‘natural kinds’ as a matter of jargon.
Hacking (1991) attributes the phrase ‘natural kinds’ to John Venn, and the attribution is part of the
standard narrative; e.g., it is repeated uncritically by Laura Snyder (2006, 157 n. 2). Although Venn uses
the words ‘natural’ and ‘kind’ together, it is unclear that Venn was responsible for ‘natural kind’ as a ﬁxed
phrase; see Khalidi (2013, 3) and Magnus (2014b, 2–3).
2. In prior work (Magnus 2014b), I debunk the ﬁrst claim of continuity by showing that the recent
vogue for natural kinds is not a continuation of nineteenth-century debates that used the same phrase.
3. Hawley and Bird (2011) call these the ‘naturalness’ and ‘kindhood’ questions, respectively, and
point out that the distinction is not typically made.
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category must do in order to fulﬁll the natural kind role, but it need not specify the fundamental ontology of such categories.
The second question concerns ontology: What kind of being has a natural
kind got? Answers might appeal to causal structure, universals, or primitive similarity. Call these the taxonomy and ontology question, respectively.4
The two questions are conﬂated in many recent discussions of natural kinds.
If we answer the taxonomy question by saying that natural kinds are those
that carve nature at its joints, then we answer the ontology question in terms
of nature’s joints. We discharge both questions at once, and so it would be
gratuitous to distinguish them. The same elision occurs in more sophisticated
accounts. For David Lewis and followers, natural properties are “an élite minority of special properties” (Lewis 1983, 346), and that eliteness is a matter
of fundamental metaphysics. A category is a natural kind if and only if it corresponds to a natural property, providing taxonomy and ontology altogether.
Similar elision follows for any essentialist account in which natural kinds stand
in a one-to-one relationship with essences.
My central claim here is that Mill gives the two questions importantly different answers. As a matter of history, Mill’s categories cannot be neatly mapped
onto contemporary terms. At the end, I brieﬂy suggest how we might proﬁt
by minding the distinction that Mill made in the nineteenth century but that
was lost in the twentieth.

2. Whewell
This section brieﬂy considers some features of William Whewell’s account of
classiﬁcation. As we will see, Mill explicitly engages Whewell, and the contrast
between their views highlights Mill’s innovation.5
Whewell claims that the aim of taxonomy is to provide a natural classiﬁcation, to divide things into kinds or—as he more often writes—natural classes.
These are the categories that will support systematic induction. He writes that
4. Even though the labels are mine, rather than Mill’s, it is clear that natural groups and Kinds play
two diﬀerent roles in his system. So (I argue) it is not anachronistic to see them as answers to diﬀerent
questions.
5. Mill explicitly acknowledges Whewell as providing him the crucial clue to Kinds. Mill had stopped
working on the Logic for 5 years, because he was unable to make sense of induction. But Whewell’s 1837
History of the Inductive Sciences provided Mill with the comprehensive survey of physical science that he
needed to move ahead (Mill 1873/2003). Although Mill found much to disagree with in Whewell’s
philosophy, there are considerable similarities in their accounts of natural classiﬁcation. Mill quotes
Whewell approvingly on the topic (Mill 1874, 488) and, where he disagrees, still quotes Whewell at some
length (501–2). For more on the relation between Whewell and Mill on classiﬁcation, see Snyder (2006)
and McOuat (2009).
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“since the truths we are to attend to are scientiﬁc truths, governed by precise
and homogeneous relations, we must not found our scientiﬁc Classiﬁcation on
casual, indeﬁnite, and unconnected considerations” (Whewell 1858, 115).
Importantly, for Whewell, natural classes will support scientiﬁc inference
because they reﬂect the underlying construction of the world. So taxonomy
aims not merely to organize things for science but also to discover the world’s
construction. Discussing mineralogy, Whewell writes, “The science which we
require is a complete and consistent classiﬁed system of all inorganic bodies.
For chemistry proceeds upon the principle that the constitution of a body invariably determines its properties; and consequently, its kind” (1837, 189). Discussing botany, he writes similarly, “No person, however, who wishes to know
botany as a science, that is, as a body of general truths, can be content with
making names his ultimate object. Such a person will be constantly and irresistibly led on to attempt to catch sight of the natural arrangement of plants,
even before he discovers, as he will discover by pursuing such a course of study,
that the knowledge of the natural arrangement is the knowledge of the essential construction and vital mechanism of plants” (319–20). So what makes
kinds natural for Whewell is ultimately the “constitution” and “construction” of
things. The taxonomy and ontology questions are answered together.

3. Mill
Initially in book 1 of the Logic, Mill distinguishes Kinds (with a capital K) from
arbitrary classes. A class can be indicated by any property or list of properties.
For example, the class of white things corresponds to the property of being
white, and the class of red round things corresponds to the properties of being
red and of being round. Because there is a class corresponding to any property
or list of properties, no such class is more natural than any other. White things
have nothing in common beyond their whiteness and its necessary consequences (e.g., that all white things are nontransparent). In contrast, Kinds are
classes of things that share indeﬁnitely many properties. There are some diagnostic criteria that we associate with a chemical kind or biological species,
but the members share many properties apart from those that we use to mark
the Kind. On Mill’s view, a Kind “is distinguished from all other classes by an
indeterminate multitude of properties not derivable from one another” (1874,
99).
For Mill, Kinds are crucial for inductive generalization. Suppose we subject
a sample of phosphorus to an experimental condition in the lab and we infer
that other samples of phosphorus will react similarly. This relies on the other
phosphorus, the stuﬀ outside the lab, sharing enough properties with our sam272
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ple that the condition happening to them counts as an instance of the same
cause. We identify other samples of phosphorus merely by diagnostic criteria,
so how can we rely on distinct bits of phosphorus sharing further properties
beyond those used to diagnose them as phosphorus? We can do so, Mill would
say, because phosphorus is a Kind. The diagnostic criteria identify samples as
members of the Kind, assuring that they share indeﬁnitely many other features.
In this example, the fact that all lumps of phosphorus are the same Kind is
crucial to a causal inference about what things like this will do. Yet, because of
Mill’s conception of causation, Kinds cannot themselves be held together by
causes. Mill thinks of causal inference as guided by the law of causation, which
states that every event is preceded by some circumstances that necessitate it:
when those circumstances occur, the eﬀect invariably follows (1874, 410). This
means that causes are regularities that obtain between prior and subsequent
events.
Kinds are also regularities, but they obtain between diﬀerent things at the
same time (e.g., all the samples of phosphorus) rather than between events at
diﬀerent times (e.g., heating of phosphorus and subsequent ignitions). For a
Kind, Mill writes, the shared properties are an “invariable co-existent, in the
same manner as an event must have an invariable antecedent” (1874, 410).
Kinds are structures of noncausal regularities.
Laura Snyder describes Mill as “denying that kinds are natural” and writes
that Mill’s Kinds “are not real kinds.” What she means by this is that, for Mill,
there is no underlying mechanism “causally responsible for the production of . . .
shared superﬁcial qualities” (Snyder 2006, 164). She is correct that Mill’s Kinds
do not have a real essence in Locke’s sense, that there is no deeper and more
fundamental process that causally produces the regularity observed in members
of the Kind. Unlike Whewell, Mill refuses to talk about the constitution or
essential construction of things. However, Mill’s Kinds are not inquiry dependent or merely nominal.6 Each corresponds to a law of nature, a law of coexistence that has the same reality as diachronic causal laws. They are deﬁned in
terms of how things are, rather than in terms of actual or possible science.
In book 4, Mill takes up “operations subsidiary to induction” such as observation, abstraction, naming, and classiﬁcation. In discussing naming, Mill
explicitly invokes the conception of Kinds that he developed in book 1.7 In
6. Mill writes that “there are in nature distinctions of Kind; distinctions not consisting in a given
number of deﬁnite properties plus the eﬀects which follow from those properties, but running through
the whole nature . . . of the things so distinguished” (1874, 502).
7. Mill calls a system of names for Kinds ‘nomenclature’, in contrast to mere ‘terminology’. Lavoisier’s
new chemistry and Linnaeus’s system of biology, he writes, provided nomenclature. The taxonomic
innovations allowed inquiry to move beyond parochial concerns, to chart Kinds rather than mere cat273
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discussing classiﬁcation, Mill makes a diﬀerent distinction between natural
groups and merely technical or artiﬁcial ones. He says some natural groups
will be Kinds but that not all of them will be. Natural groups—in contrast to
Kinds—are characterized by their function in scientiﬁc inquiry.
Properly scientiﬁc classiﬁcation, in order to be as general as possible, should
reﬂect the causal structure of things. It is best “when the objects are formed
into groups respecting which a greater number of general propositions can be
made. . . . The properties, therefore, according to which objects are classiﬁed
should, if possible, be those which are causes of many other properties” (Mill
1874, 499). He distinguishes properly natural classiﬁcation from artiﬁcial classiﬁcation: “A classiﬁcation thus formed is properly scientiﬁc or philosophical,
and is commonly called a Natural, in contradistinction to Technical or Artiﬁcial, classiﬁcation or arrangement” (499). The categories that ﬁgure in a natural classiﬁcation he calls natural groups. Mill uses the adjective ‘natural’ here to
discuss natural classiﬁcation and natural groups, but he never uses it to modify Kinds. The phrase ‘natural kind’ was not part of his vocabulary.
Mill insists that science will need names for more than just Kinds. He does
think that Kinds should appear in a proper scientiﬁc classiﬁcation, and so Kinds
qualify as natural groups—but he insists that a complete classiﬁcation will require more categories than there are Kinds. He writes, “The distinctions between Kinds are not numerous enough to make up the whole of classiﬁcation”
(Mill 1874, 503).
The natural groups that are not Kinds distinguish the important qualities
of things. This is subject to the worry that importance depends on human concerns. Mill recognizes this worry, acknowledging that farmers divide plants differently than botanists and that geologists divide fossils diﬀerently than zoologists (1874, 500). If this were the end of it, then natural groups (apart
from those that correspond to Kinds) would not be real features of the world.
They would be determined by our sense of what is important, shaped by our
projects and interests. Diﬀerent concerns could make for diﬀerent taxa.
Mill avoids this result by saying that the natural groups are those that would
ﬁgure in the science of a disinterested inquirer. He writes that “when we are
studying objects not for any special practical end, but for the sake of extending
egories of interest. Having a nomenclature is the mark scientiﬁc progress, Mill thinks, and in other ﬁelds a
lack of nomenclature “is now the principle cause which retards the progress of the science” (1874, 492).
Mill deﬁnes ‘nomenclature’ explicitly by reference to Kinds, as “the collection of names of all the Kinds
with which any branch of knowledge is conversant” (492). He takes this distinction from Whewell. Mill
writes, “The words Nomenclature and Terminology are employed by most authors almost indiscriminately; Dr. Whewell being, as far as I am aware, the ﬁrst writer who has regularly assigned to the two words
diﬀerent meanings” (492).
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our knowledge of the whole of their properties and relations, we must consider
as the most important attributes those which . . . would most impress the
attention of a spectator who knew all their properties but was not especially
interested in any. Classes formed on this principle may be called, in a more
emphatic manner than any others, natural groups” (Mill 1874, 500–501).
Natural groups would be identiﬁed by an ideal, neutral observer. So they are
objective in the sense of not being dependent on any particular subjective
standpoint.
Mill’s characterization of natural groups as the categories of an intersubjectively warranted taxonomy diverges from his characterization of Kinds as
determined by objective laws of coexistence. The two characterizations do not
pick out the same categories, and their rationale is importantly diﬀerent. Natural groups are deﬁned in terms of possible or ideal inquiry, whereas Kinds
are deﬁned just in terms of how the world is.
By contrast, although Whewell provides characterizations of Natural Classes
both as objects of possible inquiry and as features of the world, for him the
diﬀerence is just one of exposition. As we saw, Whewell thought that ideal
scientiﬁc inquiry should divide things by their essential constitutions.
To put the diﬀerence in our terms, we might approach natural kinds by way
of taxonomy or by way of ontology. For Whewell, this makes no diﬀerence,
and any legitimate scientiﬁc categories can be approached from either direction. For Mill, the two do not perfectly coincide. Beginning with taxonomy, we
get a wealth of natural groups. Beginning with ontology, we get just the Kinds.

4. Mill’s Critics
In an 1887 attack on Mill’s “doctrine of natural kinds,” M. H. Towry enumerates four objections to Mill’s account.8 For our purposes, we can treat them
as raising two broader worries.9
One worry is epistemic and semantic. According to Mill, we frame an arbitrary class by stipulating properties that hold of its members. The class of white
8. Although Franklin and Franklin (whom I discuss below) address their reply to “Mr. Towry,” it
seems likely that the author was Mary Helen Towry White. She published on a range of topics—from
the history of Scottish clans to stories of famous children—and was credited under diﬀerent variations of her name. My inability to decisively conﬁrm that this is the same Towry is an example of how
women who contributed to philosophical debates are made to disappear from our retelling of them.
9. Towry begins with a fair and concise summary of Mill’s view: “Mill says that a Kind is one of
those classes which are distinguished from all others, not by one or a few deﬁnite properties, but by an
unknown multitude of them; the combination of properties on which the class is grounded being a
mere index to an indeﬁnite number of other distinctive attributes, and instances Plant, Animal, Sulphur, Horse, &c., as Kinds” (1887, 435).
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things is speciﬁed just by the property white. Towry accepts this and argues that
the same is true for all classes and kinds. She writes: “Nature has in reality neither
the class White Things nor the class Horse. We made both. . . . There are a
quantity of things in the universe, alike in point of being white; there are a
quantity of things alike in points a b c, &c. = Horses. The properties are not
found by the Kind, but the Kinds are formed by the properties” (Towry 1887,
436). So, Towry writes, “one class is no whit less a merely intellectual creation
than the other” (436).
Another worry is metaphysical. Mill posits a diﬀerence in kind between
Kinds and mere classes, but Towry objects that there is at most a diﬀerence in
degree. There are anomalies and intermediate cases. Towry invokes Whewell,
writing that “Whewell’s type-theory seems to me nearer the truth than Mill’s
impassable barriers, because it recognizes inﬁnite gradations and interminglings” (1887, 438). But Towry dissents from both Whewell and Mill by insisting that Kinds are just nominal classes. She writes, “When we advance beyond
Singulars to many individuals or substances forming a ‘natural Kind,’ we have
made an arbitrary and conventional combination” (438). That is to say, the
Kind does not correspond to anything in nature.
I think that Mill can fairly be seen to anticipate the ﬁrst worry. He recognizes that the semantics for Kinds must be diﬀerent from the semantics for
stipulated groups, and so he holds that the term for a Kind has a diﬀerent connotation than the term for an arbitrary class. The term for an arbitrary class
consists merely of some stipulated attributes. The term for a Kind consists of
some attributes that distinguish the class along with the commitment to that
class’s being a Kind.10
I think that Mill also has a ready response to Towry’s second worry, because
he only introduces Kinds as a way to understand how inductive generalization
is possible. If Towry’s worry were legitimate, then there would be no diﬀerence
in the world between real groups (like phosphorus) and an arbitrarily concatenated group (like the union of phosphorus and sandwiches)—but then there
would be no more ground to generalize from samples of phosphorus than from
samples of phosphorus-or-sandwiches. This point is especially clear in hind10. Regarding terms for Kinds, Mill writes, “besides connoting certain attributes, they also connote
that those attributes are distinctive of a Kind” (1874, 493). This is an explicit point of contrast with
Whewell. On Whewell’s account, we identify an exemplary individual as the type, and the Kind is the
class of things that are suﬃciently similar to the type specimen. On Mill’s account, we identify a list of
properties that are diagnostic of the Kind, and the Kind is the class of things that share the diagnostic
properties and indeﬁnitely many more. As Whewell would have it, we read the diagnostic properties oﬀ
of a designated type specimen. Mill allows that we can imagine a type specimen, but he thinks that we
do so by imagining a thing with all of the diagnostic properties (501–5). Schwartz (2013) provides an
extended discussion of Mill’s semantics for Kind terms.
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sight, because we are familiar with Goodman’s new riddle of induction. Even
though philosophers may disagree about what distinguishes ‘emerald’ from
‘emerose’ (where ‘emerose’ picks out all the observed emeralds and all the
unobserved roses), it is clear that something does. To put the point in terms
that were available to Mill’s nineteenth-century critics: making sense of science requires that there be some distinction between arbitrary and nonarbitrary
classes. Insofar as Mill is aiming at that distinction, there is something right
about his notion of Kinds.11
There are two published replies to Towry.12 In the second of these, Fabian
Franklin and Christine Ladd Franklin concede to Towry that there may be
no fundamental diﬀerence between the mental operations by which we come
to think of arbitrary classes and natural kinds but insist that there is nonetheless an important diﬀerence between them in the world. They begin, “The
doctrine of Kinds, as laid down by Mill, does not seem to be tenable . . . yet
there is, we think, a real diﬀerence between such classes and mere arbitrary
classes; and the nature of that diﬀerence may be stated very nearly as Mill stated
it” (Franklin and Franklin 1888, 83). Although they accept that any category is
“an intellectual creation,” they maintain that it could not be “a merely intellectual creation” (84).
Mill’s mistake, the Franklins suggest, was to suppose that what holds a Kind
together is a fundamental noncausal regularity that cannot be explained. Rather,
they suggest that the connection can be explained by either a causal regularity
or a historical connection between diﬀerent members of the Kind. They write:
“When a certain set of qualities entails the presence of others, and the supposition cannot be entertained that there is a causal connexion of a general nature
between them, the conclusion is inevitable . . . that there is a certain community of origin among the objects possessing that set of qualities” (Franklin and
Franklin 1888, 84). By ‘community of origin’ they mean some common cause;
that is, that members of a natural kind have a shared history that explains their
shared features.
Common cause provides a way to explain regularity, without it being the
unconditional result of causal or noncausal laws. Because of their common his11. One might worry that my reading of Mill describes Kinds as independent of inquiry, but the
reply to Towry defends Kinds by appealing to the possibility of inquiry. Such a worry is easily defused:
although making sense of inquiry provides Mill’s reason for positing Kinds, Kinds are not deﬁned in
terms of inquiry.
12. In the ﬁrst of these, Monck (1887) insists that taxonomy is not a subject that should be addressed by a logician at all, since it concerns knowledge of what the world is actually like. This objection
is oddly hidebound. It is obvious in the sections on Kinds and categories that Mill, like Whewell before
him, is doing philosophy of science.
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tory, the members of such a Kind will share features beyond those that we
initially notice or by which we diagnose membership in the Kind; when “we
regard the invariable concomitance of certain qualities with certain other marks
as proof of a common origin in the objects possessing those marks, there is no
reason for setting any limit to the number of ways in which that common
origin will be betrayed” (Franklin and Franklin 1888, 85).
A consequence of this proposal is that Mill’s exemplary Kinds turn out to
be a disparate lot. Biological species are groups of common descent, and so
they can be explained by community of origin. Yet chemical kinds do not seem
to be. Rather, it seems more likely that chemical regularities are a matter of
causal law. Considering the example of sodium, Franklin and Franklin write,
“there is not . . . any external evidence that all the sodium . . . in the universe was derived from a common stock; but it seems highly probable that
either this is the case or else that all the properties of sodium are deducible by
general laws from a few of them . . . [that] the properties of sodium are deductions from its molecular constitution” (1888, 85). The only general thing
to say about Kinds is that their unity can be explained either by general laws
or by common causes—that is, “either the qualities or the objects have a real
connexion with each other” (85).
This furthers the division between taxonomy and ontology that we saw already in Mill’s account. For Mill, some but not all natural groups correspond
to Kinds in the world. So the characterization of the criteria for what makes a
category natural is separate from the metaphysical description of what it is in
the world that satisﬁes those criteria. Franklin and Franklin drive the wedge
further, by suggesting that diﬀerent categories might be realized in the world
in fundamentally diﬀerent ways. Some natural groups, like chemical elements,
are uniﬁed because members of the kind have a similar composition and so
behave similarly according to general, causal laws. Others, like biological species, are uniﬁed by sharing a historical source and so behave similarly because
of their common cause.

5. Conclusion
If we treat the nineteenth-century discussions as an anticipation of debates
about natural kinds in the last 50 years, Mill has two separate notions that
might be mapped onto our current term ‘natural kind’: Kinds and natural
groups. As is usual in the history of philosophy, it would be a gross oversimpliﬁcation to treat this simply as a matter of translation. The fact that there is
not one clear counterpart to our term ‘natural kind’ suggests that, in some sense,
Mill was not thinking about natural kinds the way that we do.
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We should not pretend that Mill had two entangled notions where we now
simply have one. Quite the contrary, we can distinguish the taxonomy and ontology questions about what we call natural kinds. First, what criteria distinguish natural kinds from arbitrary categories? Second, what features of the
world make some categories but not others satisfy these criteria?
Failure to mind this distinction can be seen to lead to confusion in recent
debates. Establishing this is beyond the scope of this article, but I will point
to one suggestive illustration: the idea that natural kinds are homeostatic
property clusters (HPCs) is most plausible if we treat it as an answer to the
ontology question for many but not all natural kinds. Yet many authors respond to HPC accounts just by providing examples of natural kinds that are
not HPCs or of HPCs that are not natural kinds. Those counterexamples are
only relevant if we take HPCs as an answer to both questions, to deﬁne both
what it is to be a natural kind and what a natural kind is in the world.13
We should reject the usual historical account, according to which Mill’s
Kinds matured into our natural kinds. We understand Mill better if we recognize that he was struggling with separate issues and that he introduced several
notions to resolve them. To revisit Hacking’s metaphor: the scholastic darkness that shadows present discussions of natural kinds may be dissolved not by
abandoning natural kinds altogether but by recognizing complexities too often
overlooked. We would do well to let a Millian ﬂower bloom.
REFERENCES
Bird, Alexander, and Emma Tobin. 2009. “Natural Kinds.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Dupré, John. 2011. “Foreword.” In Carving Nature at Its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics
and Science, ed. Joseph Keim Campell, Michael O’Rourke, and Matthew H. Slater, vii–
viii. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Franklin, Fabian, and Christine Ladd Franklin. 1888. “Mill’s Natural Kinds.” Mind 13 (49):
83–85.
Hacking, Ian. 1991. “A Tradition of Natural Kinds.” Philosophical Studies 61:109–26.
———. 2007. “Natural Kinds: Rosy Dawn, Scholastic Twilight.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:203–39.
Hawley, Katherine, and Alexander Bird. 2011. “What Are Natural Kinds?” Philosophical
Perspectives 25 (1): 205–21.
Khalidi, Muhammad Ali. 2013. Natural Categories and Human Kinds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

13. I discuss this example at greater length in Magnus (2014a).
279

HOPOS

|

Mill on Taxonomy and Natural Kinds

Lewis, David. 1983. “New Work for a Theory of Universals.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4): 343–77.
Magnus, P. D. 2014a. “NK ≠ HPC.” Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256): 471–77.
———. 2014b. “No Grist for Mill on Natural Kinds.” Journal for the History of Analytical
Philosophy 2 (4): 1–15.
McOuat, Gordon. 2009. “The Origins of ‘Natural Kinds’: Keeping ‘Essentialism’ at Bay in
the Age of Reform.” Intellectual History Review 19 (2): 211–30.
Mill, John Stuart. 1873/2003.Autobiography. Project Gutenberg. http://www.gutenberg
.org/ebooks/10378.
———. 1874. A System of Logic. 8th ed. New York: Harper.
Monck, W. H. S. 1887. “Mill’s Doctrine of Natural Kinds.” Mind 12 (48): 637–40.
Schwartz, Stephen P. 2013. “Mill and Kripke on Proper Names and Natural Kind Terms.”
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (5): 925–45.
Snyder, Laura J. 2006. Reforming Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Towry, M. H. 1887. “On the Doctrine of Natural Kinds.” Mind 12 (47): 434–38.
Whewell, William. 1837. The History of the Inductive Sciences. Vol 3. London: Parker.
———. 1858. The History of Scientiﬁc Ideas. Vol. 2, 3rd ed. London: Parker.

280

